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Abstract :
The paper uses a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneous ﬁrms and produc-
tivity asymmetry to evaluate the eﬀects of temporary movement of labour from a
developing to a developed country. In autarky, migration induces a decrease of survival
productivity threshold implying that less productive ﬁrms of the receiving country are now
able to survive. The receiving country also enjoys an increase in the welfare because of
decrease of the price level. However the people living in the source country experience a
decrease in welfare when remittances are not taken into consideration. In open economy
the exporting ﬁrms of the receiving and domestic ﬁrms of sending countries experience a
fall in minimum required productivity threshold. The result on the welfare and price level
of the sending and receiving countries are ambiguous.
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．Introduction
Movement of labour across national borders is now a core element of public and policy
debates. The debates however focuses mainly on immigration and temporary migration of
labour and the eﬀects of temporary migration receive less attention. The economic
literature on migration also heavily biased in analysing the eﬀects of permanent migration
and ignores of the case of temporary migration (Dustmann and Görlach 2016). In this
paper we aim to address this by issue that is how temporary movement of labour can
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bring beneﬁts to the countries concerned.
Many countries now control temporary migration of labour through bilateral migration
agreements. Temporary migration of labour is additionally addressed under the framework
proposed by World Trade Organization (WTO) through the Mode 4 of the General
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS
1)
). So far Economic literature analysed the beneﬁt
of GATS type labour migration from a global perspective. Winters (2002) estimated that
increased mobility equivalent to 3％ of the receiving countriesʼ work forces would generate
$156 billion per year in extra economic welfare. Rodrik (2004) pointed that the highest
beneﬁt of liberalisation at present world can be generated by the liberalisation of move-
ment of temporary workers and not from much discussed increased market access or
liberalisation of agricultural trade. However negotiations on the issue of migration are
problematic as countries are in general despite the potential for huge beneﬁt, still reluctant
to open up their borders for movements of labour under WTO (Winters 2005). The
growing public sentiment against migration is also evident inpopularity of anti-
globalization and anti-establishment movements in Western political arenas. Trade negotia-
tors and politicians of developed countries are uneasy about the issue of labour movement
because of these political pressures. It is often argued that the sending countries cannot
guarantee return and temporariness (Friedman and Ahmed 2008), hence there is a
resistance to open up borders within GATS framework and this resistance is likely to be
continued (Poot and Strutt 2010). The reluctance and resistance are even notable in
bilateral migration agreements.
It can be noted that the countries involved in international negotiation are lacking
proper understanding of how temporary movement of people can be beneﬁcial. What is
missing here are some studies aiming to evaluate the beneﬁt of movement of labour from
a single countryʼs perspective. If a worldwide movement of labour is initiated, studies like
Winters (2002), Rodrick (2004) will be applicable but these are not useful to provide
policy guidelines to a single country in migration negotiations rounds. One study by
Walmsey and Winter (2007) divided the world in separate regions and gains are not
evenly distributed but again the study is not useful to provide guideline from a single
countryʼs perspective. Schiﬀ (2007) and Bchir (2008) addressed the Mode 4 trade but only
in the context of receiving countries illegal migration problem. Schiﬀ (2007) studied
optimal migration policy under permanent, guest-worker (GW) and Mode 4 program. In
summary the paper ﬁnds that policy makers should consider implementing Mode 4 rather
than Guest Workersʼ Program as the number of illegal migrants is lower, number of
migrants is higher and governmentʼs welfare is higher with Mode 4.
In general, there a dearth of literature on temporary migration which can give guide-
lines to the policy makers in international migration negotiations. A large body of literature
addressed the issue of wage determination of immigrants and its impact on nativeʼs
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earning (for a review of literature, Kerr and Kerr 2011). These works assume that
immigrants compete with natives in the labour market for wage and employment opportu-
nities. But bilateral migration agreements do not cover permanent migration and the wage
determination process of temporary workers is not necessarily the same as the wage
determination process of natives and immigrants. Temporary workers may not even
compete with the domestic workers in labour market. One of the oldest successful
contractual labour migration programs is Canadaʼs ʻSeasonal Agricultural Workersʼ Pro-
gramʼ initiated in 1960s. The reason of the initiation of the program was the unavailability
of agricultural workers in the pick season even at a high market wage (Verma 2004).
Moreover, the temporary workers can be contracted to received wage rate lower than the
prevailing market wage rate. They can diﬀer according to nationality. For example wages
of housemaids in Gulf countries are Philippines Dh 1,470 ($400), India Dh 1,100, Sri Lanka
Dh 825, Bangladesh Dh. 750 (Gulf News 2008). A recent body of literature has however
started to pay more attention to the issue of temporary migration though not necessarily
on wage determinations process. Notably Dustmann and Görlach (2016) provides a survey
of literature and analyses the possible impact of migration temporariness to the both host
and source countries. Dustmann and Mestres (2010) look at the relationship between
temporariness and remittances and identiﬁed that temporary migrations are likely to lead
to higher remittances ﬂow.
In this regards the brain drain (gain) literature deserves some attention. The aim of the
literature is to look at the gain or loss of the developing countries through outﬂow of
human capital (for reviews see Chowdhury and Telli 2016, Docquier and Rapoport 2012 ;
Schiﬀ 2006). But they are in general applicable to skilled labour movement whereas
bilateral or multilateral agreements look at both skilled and unskilled movements. The
brain drain (gain) studies evaluate the cost of migration on unilateral basis and not much
concerned about the role of remittances in the economies of sending countries.
The paper addresses the gap in the literature to evaluate the economic beneﬁt of
temporary movement from a single countryʼs perspective. It incorporates international
migration within a Melitz type (Melitz 2003 ; Helpman et al. 2004) intra-industry trade
model, that is, in a monopolistic competition model where ﬁrmsʼ productivities are allowed
to be heterogeneous. Falvey et al. (2006, 2005 and 2011) extended the model of heterogene-
ous ﬁrm to allow for inter-country asymmetry of productivity and size. We have incorpo-
rated migration and remittances in the model. We utilised these models in our paper as
simultaneous presence of intra-industry trade between technologically advanced-backward
countries and international migration is observed in many parts of the world. The
interlinkage of migration and trade was also analysed by Iranzo and Peri (2009) and
Egger et al. (2012) though not speciﬁcally focusing on temporary migration.
Following the tradition of the literature of ﬁrm heterogeneity we analyse the eﬀects of
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migration in both autarky and in open economy. In autarky, the eﬀects of international
migration on the welfare of technologically advanced country are identiﬁed clearly. Interna-
tional migration, in autarky, allows less productive ﬁrms of the receiving countries to
survive in the market. The welfare of the country is higher as price level falls because of
migration. However the technologically backward country that is from which migration
takes place becomes worse oﬀ as the welfare of the people who remain behind fall. This
result is contradicting with the results of highly inﬂuential paper of Grubel and Scott
(1966) that showed that welfare of those who stay behind remains unchanged. However if
we allow for remittances then the welfare of the sending country may increase but it is
not a certainty. In open economy the results are not so straight forward. The exporter and
domestic ﬁrms of both receiving and sending countries may experience decrease in
survival productivities. The price equations also do not show clear pattern for improve-
ment of welfare.
The organisation of remaining part of the paper is as follows. The second section
proposes the basic features, assumptions and notations of the model. In the third section
we look at the equilibrium in autarky with migration. In forth section, we assume open
economies and see how the migration has an eﬀect on a countryʼs trade, productivity and
welfare. The ﬁfth section concludes the paper.
．The Model, Basic Assumptions and Notations
. Demand, Wage rate of Host and Source Country
Following Falvey et al. (2006, 2005 and 2011) we assume two countries deﬁned as ʻHostʼ
and ʻSourceʼ consisting of two sectors of production. In host country, one of the sectors is a
homogenous and perfectly competitive sector which we denote as H. The other sector is
consisted of diﬀerentiated goods and denoted by Y. Preference of the representative
consumer is Cobb-Douglas type deﬁned by the following utility function :
U=H Y  ⑴
where H=Homogenous goods
Y=Diﬀerentiated goods
and 0<β<1
The total expenditure is given by H+PY where the relative price of diﬀerentiated good
is given by P. The price of homogenous good is set as numeraire and assumed equal to 1.
As the homogenous sector is perfectly competitive we get :
wa=1 ⑵
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where a is the ﬁxed unit labour coeﬃcient implying the amount of labour required to
produce one unit of homogenous good and w is the wage rate. The equation shows that in
a competitive sector, unit price of a product is equal to unit production cost of the
product. From the equation ⑵, the wage rate of homogenous sector is obtained as
w=1/a. As domestic labour can move freely between homogenous and diﬀerentiated
sectors, w is the equilibrium ware rate of domestic labour in home in both sectors. The
employment in homogenous sector is given as :
L=aH ⑶
where L is the total labour used in homogenous sector. Assume that the total endowment
of domestic labour is given by L . M is the amount of migrant labour. Hence,
L+M=L+L ⑷
where, L=labour in diﬀerentiated sector. Let us assume that the market size of the host
country is given as Φ which shows the total expenditure within the economy. Then we
must have,
H+PY=Φ ⑸
Forming lagriagian and using ﬁrst order conditions, the solutions for equilibrium
demands of homogenous and diﬀerentiated goods are obtained as
H=1−βΦ and Y=
βΦ
P
⑹
The economy of the source country is deﬁned in similar fashion. The complete descrip-
tion of source country is given later.
. Deﬁning Migration
Assume that the country can import additional labour from abroad through bilateral or
multilateral agreements. The foreign workers work for only one period and then return
back with the income they receive. In autarky they can be regarded as returning back
with income in term of goods. The migrant workers receive wage w−s where 0≤s<w.
Hence migrant workers are recruited at a lower wage rate compared to the wage rate
of domestic workers. This idea of modelling migrantsʼ wage came from Chanda (2001) who
suggested a few mechanisms to make GATS workable. It is sometimes thought that wage
rates of migrants should be at par with the nativesʼ wage rates. Within GATS format
wage diﬀerentials actually give the poor countries the advantage to export labour to rich
countries. To make it simple we can just consider it as the price of labour service instead
of wage, thus the labour service can be acquired from any part of the world and the low
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cost one is the most desired. However, as noted by Chanda, lower reservation wage rate of
migrants exposes them to higher possibility of exploitation. Additionally, as the wage rates
are low the producers may only recruit migrant workers thereby it may have adverse
impact on employment opportunities of native workers. Thus a balance should be found
between these conﬂicting objectives to make agreements for temporary migration worka-
ble.
We may also want to ﬁnd empirical evidence of whether in reality migrants receive
lower wage compared to the natives. Such studies are not readily available. It can be
however established using simple deductive reasoning. The empirical works on immigration
showed that immigrants in general start with a lower income than that of comparable
group of natives (Borjas 1994). The studies have shown that after a certain period of time
(e.g. 20 years) immigrants may experience convergence of income. Thus even with the
convergence, the life time income of immigrants is lower than the comparable group of
natives.
It should be here noted that in this paper we are not concerned about immigrants or
permanent migrants. Rather the focus is on temporary migrants. Temporary migrants
wage determination process will depend on the relative bargaining power of the country of
origin. Diﬀerent cohorts of temporary workers may experience diﬀerent wage rates. For
example, migrants in the Middle East receive diﬀerent wage rates based on their
nationalities. To what extent the wage rate reﬂects their intrinsic productivity is still an
open question. The migrants of poor countries can oﬀer labour services at a lower wage
rate because of low reservation level. The lower wage rates also do not necessarily show
discrimination, such as gender or racial discrimination prevailed in history.
We assume in this paper that the migrants cannot replace domestic labour given the
regulation that domestic labour must be fully employed before employing foreign labour.
The entry of migration is limited by a preﬁxed quota. This assumption highly reﬂects the
labour recruitment strategy of the developed countries. But such quota is often practised
because of the socio-economic concerns of adverse eﬀects of migration. We have not
modelled any such adverse eﬀects. The assumption of restrictive quota nevertheless helps
us to concentrate on the main goal of assessing the beneﬁt of temporary movement of
labour.
. Demand, Production and Labour Allocation in Diﬀerentiated Sector
.. Demand of Diﬀerentiated Goods
In the section 2.1 we have derived the equilibrium demand of homogenous and
diﬀerentiated goods. In this section we look at the demand of Y more closely as it is
deﬁned as a composite index of diﬀerentiated goods. This composite good consist of a
bundle of closely related product varieties which are close but imperfect substitutes. The
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consumption of Y is given by following standard Dixit-Stiglitzʼs ʻlove of varietyʼ form:
Y= 

idi

where, i stands for variety i and V stands for available set of varieties, 0<ρ<1.
Elasticity of substitution is deﬁned as ε=
1
1−p
>1. The higher is ε the better substitute
the varieties are. This formulation captures the notion of preference for diversity as the
consumer prefer to spread consumption over the spectrum of diﬀerentiated good rather
than concentrating on single variety
2)
. The total demand of diﬀerentiated good has been
obtained as Y=
βΦ
P
. Therefore total expenditure on diﬀerentiated good is PY=βΦ. The
budget constraint for consumption of diﬀerentiated good is then,


piidi=PY=βΦ
Using Lagrange method, the solution obtained via the two stage budgeting procedure is,
i=Api ⑺
where A=βΦP，ε=
1
1−ρ
and P= 

pidi

Hence, P denotes the aggregate price index. The solution shows the demand for
individual variety i is increasing in the aggregate price index and the market size.
Additionally, the demand is negatively related with the own price. The higher is the ε or
elasticity of substitution the higher is the aggregate price index and the own price.
.. Production and Wage Rate in Diﬀerentiated Sector
Firms incur two types of costs in production of diﬀerentiated goods. One is a constant
marginal cost ofproduction, denoted by a, which is diﬀerent across ﬁrms. The other one is
ﬁxed cost F in production which is identical across all ﬁrms and all countries. For
example, labour requirement Li of the ﬁrm producing variety i with marginal cost a
is given as Li=F+ai. This speciﬁcation shows increasing returns to scale as
average cost declines with output. It is assumed that both ﬁxed cost and marginal costs
are exogenous to the model.
In the labour market, domestic workers are recruited atthe wage rate w. Firms can
employ migrants from outside after full employment of domestic labour. As previously
discussed, migrants are recruited only by ﬁrms operating in diﬀerentiated sector. It is also
assumed that M number of migrants are recruited at a wage rate w−s. M shows entry
quota which is assumed to be suﬃciently low so that a number domestic labour always
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work in diﬀerentiated sector. As the number of domestic labour in sector Y is given as
L−L the average wage rate in the diﬀerentiated sector is calculated as,
W=w−
sM
L
⑻
In order to calculate the average wage we have made a crucial assumption that M gives
the pool of migrant labour in the economy. Note that full employment of domestic workers
must be ensured, therefore if ﬁrms are regulated such that migrants can only be hired
after the full employment of natives, then it provides ﬁrms an incentive to delay the entry
as wage rate of migrants is lower than the wage rate of the natives. All ﬁrms then would
try to enter after full employment the native labour. We therefore assume that total
migrants are given by a pool. A ﬁrm may get the allocation of labour by a mechanism
similar to a lottery. All ﬁrms would pay the average wage for per unit of labour recruited.
It hence implies that those who get more migrants subsidise the ﬁrms who use more
native labour. All ﬁrms therefore pay equal amount for recruitment of a unit of labour and
there is no incentive to delay the entry. This assumption may not depict a completely real
situation but it is useful in simplifying analysis following our main goal.
The total cost of a ﬁrm producing variety i therefore is,
ci=WLi=FW+Wai
The revenue and operating proﬁts are respectively,
ri=pii and πi=pii−ci
Diﬀerentiating the operating proﬁt with respect to pi and after necessary calculation,
price as a function of marginal cost a is obtained as,
pa=W
a
ρ
⑼
An interesting feature of the above equation is that the price function contains no
information of the varieties. Price is same for any other ﬁrm producing a diﬀerent variety
with same marginal cost. Now by using the equation ⑼, the revenue and operating proﬁts
of the ﬁrm are obtained as,
ra=AW 
a
ρ 

and πa=BW a−FW
where, B=A1−ρρ
Thus both the revenue and operating proﬁts of the ﬁrms are higher if the ﬁrms face a
lower average wage rate.
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. Firmʼs Entry, Exist and Productivity Distribution
Assume that is upon entry the ﬁrms in host country draw the marginal cost a from a
country speciﬁc cumulative distribution Ga. The entrants pay an irreversible ﬁxed cost
F in term of labour unit, which is identical across all countries. The decision to stay or
exit depends on whether operating proﬁt is positive or not. Let a be the marginal cost
required for the zero operating proﬁt. Thus the ʻsurvival ceilingʼ a is given by,
πa=BW
a
−FW=0 ⑽
Any marginal cost above survival ceiling a implies that a ﬁrm makes negative
operating proﬁt hence would not carry out the production. Following Falvey et al. (2005,
2006 and 2011) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) we parameterise the technology by
assuming that Ga follows a Pareto distribution which common shape parameter k≥1
but with a cost upper bound a , that is,
Ga= aa 

where a∈0，a . As mentioned by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) the shape parameter k
shows the dispersion of cost draw. When k=1, the cost distribution is uniform. As k
increases, the relative number of high-cost ﬁrms increases and the cost distribution is more
concentrated on high cost level. Any truncation from above retains the same distribution
function and shape parameter k. The cost distribution of surviving ﬁrms is therefore also
Pareto with shape parameter k. The truncated cost distribution of surviving ﬁrms in
equation ⑽ is therefore,
Ga=
a
a 

where a∈0，a
The conditional probability of successful entry is given as Ga/Ga= aa 

.
Above we deﬁned the cost distribution of the host country. For our analysis we also
need to look at the cost distribution of the source country. Let us denote the country
using ʻTildaʼ. Assume that the source country is inferior in technology as such
Ga>Ga. To ensure that we assume that a≤a
≃
that is the cost upper bound is higher
for source country. Thus the technological gap between the countries is given as,
μ=
Ga
Ga
=
 aa 

 a
a
≃ 
 = a
≃
a 

≥1 ⑾
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Unlike Falvey et al. (2005, 2006 and 2011), the measurement of technological gap is not
of prime importance to us. We are here looking mainly at the relationship of ʻsurvival
ceilingʼ with the average wage rate and migration.
．Autarky Equilibrium with Migration and Remittances
In the previous section we have introduced the model and described the basic equations.
In this section we look at the impact of migration on the survival ceiling, price level and
the welfare under autarky. Autarky is a situation where countries of consideration do not
engage in trade. In this paper autarky is deﬁned in slightly diﬀerent way as we assume
that temporary migrants take their earnings back to the source country, though there
exists no formal trade between source and host countries. We denote autarky using
subscript ʻAʼ implying autarky and migration. In case of open economy the subscript is ʻTʼ
implying trade and migration. We do not use any subscript to describe migration as it is
considered in both cases. The eﬀects of migration in autarkic situation are analysed in
following subsections.
. Equilibrium Demand, Wage Rate and Labour Allocation
Deﬁne the autarkic wage rate of host country as w, the corresponding wage for the
source country is w. The migrants in host country receive wage rate w−s, the total
income of M number of migrants is given as w−sM . In autarky migrants must use up
all income in the host country by purchasing goods from the host country. The total
income of the native/domestic labour is wL . The total output of the country is equal to
the total expenditure of the country. Hence,
H+PY=wL+w−sM=wL+M −sM=Φ ⑿
where Φ shows the market size of the host in autarky. The market size with migration is
larger than the market size without migration. The solutions of equation ⑹ is modiﬁed as,
Y=
βΦ
P
and H=1−βΦ ⒀
As market size is larger there is an expansion of production in homogenous sector with
migration. Migrants only work in the heterogeneous sector but they demand goods from
both homogenous and diﬀerentiated sectors. This increased demand must be supported by
increased production in the homogenous sector. As migrants can not work in homogenous
sector the additional labour is obtained by drawing domestic labour from diﬀerentiated
sector. In order to ﬁnd the equilibrium employment in homogenous sector, we equate the
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demand and supply equations of homogenous sector and then using the fact that
L+M=L+L obtain,
L=1−βL+M 1−as 
As w=
1
a
, we have 0<1−as<1. Thus, the equation shows if the supply of migrants
increase, the employment in homogenous sector increases and it is positively related to M
and negatively related to s. The employment in diﬀerentiated sector is obtained as,
L=βL+M−M 1−β1−as
Hence the heterogeneous sector also experiences an increase of employment. The native
labour working in diﬀerentiated sector is given by,
L−L=L−1−βL+M 1−as =βL−M 1−β1−as
We can compare it with L−L=βL , which is the employment of native workers in the
diﬀerentiated sector without migration. Thus with migration the diﬀerentiated sector
experience a decline in nativeʼs participation although as long as βL>M 1−β1−as
we have native labour working in the diﬀerentiated sector. If βL=M 1−β1−as all
native labours are located in the homogenous sector. We maintain the assumption that M
is suﬃciently low so that a number of native labours always work in diﬀerentiated sector.
The average wage rate in diﬀerentiate sector is thus given as,
W=
wL−L +w−sM
L
=w−
sM
L
⒁
The above equation is the solution of the wage rate with migration as stated previously
in equation ⑻. If migration is zero the average wage is equal to host countryʼs wage rate.
By totally diﬀerentiation equation ⒁ and keeping s unchanged we obtained,
dW
dM
=−
sM 1−1−β1−as 
L
 −
s
L
<0 ⒂
Thus if migration increases average wage decreases.
. Cut Oﬀ Productivity in Diﬀerentiated Sector
Upon entry paying the ﬁxed cost F in term of labour unit, a ﬁrm obtains the
productivity
1
a
from the distribution Ga. If the ﬁrmʼs productivity is above or equal to
the threshold level
1
a
(equivalently below or equal to survival ceiling a), the ﬁrm
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operate and earn non-negative operating proﬁt. Otherwise the ﬁrm immediately leaves and
earns zero proﬁt. The entry drives the expected proﬁt net of entry cost to zero. Unlike
Melitz (2003) we do not here consider the exogenous shock implying a probability of
death of incumbents and proportional entry in each period. The model we use is also not a
dynamic model. Thus entry here implies entry as such the expected proﬁt is zero. The
term F here however requires special attention. As F shows the amount of labour used,
the total cost of entry is F multiplied by the wage rate. Melitz modelled it as the initial
sunk investment which ﬁrms must make before participating in the draw to obtain
productivity. The cost of initial investment therefore is expected to be made using the
native labour force not the migrants. Zero expected proﬁt gives,
Eπ=


πadGa+


0dGa=wF ⒃
A ﬁrm operates only if the marginal cost is below or equal to a . When marginal cost is
a

 the ﬁrm earns zero operating proﬁt. This is deﬁned as zero cut oﬀ proﬁt condition.
Utilising the zero cut of proﬁt condition and after necessary calculations we have,
Eπ=FWQa

  ⒄
where Q(a )=

  
a
a 

−1dG(a)
Integrating by parts we get,
Qa = a


a 

K−1 ⒅
Substituting equation ⒅ in the free entry condition we obtain,
 a


a 

=
wF
FWK−1
or, a=a
wF
F(K−1) 


W


 ⒆
The equation ⒆ shows that the long run survival cut oﬀ productivity of ﬁrm is higher
compare to that in no migration situation. The survival ceiling however does not depend
on the market size. To see how marginal changes in migration alter the equilibrium
survival productivity we obtain through total diﬀerentiation,
da


dW
=−
1
k
a
wF
FK−1 


W


 <0
Thus the survival productivity is inversely related to the average wage rate. If average
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wage is higher survival productivity is lower and vice versa. As average wage is inversely
related to the number of migrants, an increase in the number of migrants means an
increase in the survival ceiling. Thus with migration, the more ﬁrms can survive compared
to no migration situation which is expressed in the following proposition :
Proposition 1 : As average wage rate in diﬀerentiated sector decreases because of
increases intake of migrants, the survival ceiling of the host country increases.
. Number of Firms
Let the number of entrant denoted by N . Each ﬁrm produces a new variety and get
the productivity from the distribution Ga. The price for the ﬁrm with marginal cost a is
pa=
Wa
ρ
. The aggregate price in term of N entrants can be written as,
P= 

p(i)di


=N

 
Wa
ρ 

dG(a) 


⒇
Let us write va =


adGa. Then from the equation ⒇ we obtain
va =
P


N W

 ρ
 . From the zero cut oﬀ proﬁt condition in equation ⑽ and after
necessary manipulation we obtain P =
βΦ1−ρW

 a


Fρ
 . Using this result we obtain,
va =
βΦ1−ρa


N WF

On the other hand calculations reveal that,
va =
a
a


a

 K 
where K=
k
k−ε+1
Therefore by equating the equation ,  and using the solution of survival productivity
in equation ⒆ we get,
N

= aa 

βΦ1−ρ
KWF
=
βΦ1−ρK−1
wFK
=
ρβΦ
wFK

Looking at the equation we can see that the number of entrants is higher as the market
size is higher with migration. Again we assume that the economy is in equilibrium with
migration and analyse how it changes as the number of migrants changes. Therefore by
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diﬀerentiating totally we get,
dN 
dM
=
ρβ
wFK
w−s>0 
Hence number of entrants increases as migration takes place. The long run number of
ﬁrms is deﬁned by the number of entrants multiplied by the probability of successful
entry that is,
N= a


a 

N =
1
N
βΦ1−ρ
KWF
N =
βΦ1−ρ
FWK

Again by diﬀerentiating totally we get,
dN
dM
=
βΦ1−ρ
FW
K 
sM ( (1−(1−β)(1−as)
L
 +
s
L +
β1−ρw−s
FWK
>0
Thus as number of migrants increase the long run number of surviving ﬁrms also
increases. In proposition :
Proposition 2 : As migration increases both the number of entrants and surviving
ﬁrms of the host country increases.
. Aggregate Price of Diﬀerentiated Goods
In the calculations of previous sections, the aggregate price has been obtained as,
P
=
βΦW
1−ρ
Fρ
 a

 which can be written as,
P=a

βΦ


F

W

1−ρ

ρ
Therefore aggregate price depends on wage, market size and survival ceiling. The price
increases as survival ceiling and market size increases and decreases as average wage
decreases. By substituting the value of survival ceiling from equation ⒆ we get,
P=a
wF
F(K−1) 


W

 βΦ


F

1−ρ

ρ  
By totally diﬀerentiating equation  ,
dP
dM
=Ψ
1−ε+kε
kε−1
βΦ


W


dW
dM
−Ψ
1
ε−1
W

 βΦ


w−s<0
where
Ψ=a
wF
F(K−1) 


F

1−ρ

ρ
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Thus as migration increases price level falls.
.$ Welfare of the Host Country
Φ shows that market size of the whole economy but it contains also the migrants.
However from the policy makerʼs perspective it is important to know how the welfare of
domestic labour changes as migration takes place. The total income of domestic labour is
wL . Let us denote the consumption of homogenous and diﬀerentiated goods by domestic
labour as H ′ and Y ′. Therefore the demand of the two goods is obtained as,
H ′=1−βwL and Y ′=
βwL
P
By substituting the demand, as obtained above, in utility function we obtain,
U=H ′Y ′=β1−β wLP

Therefore the per capita welfare of domestic labour is,
U
L
=β1−β wP

Therefore the welfare of the domestic labour increases when the aggregate price of
diﬀerentiated goods decreases. As price decreases when migration increases, the welfare of
domestic labour increases with migration.
Proposition 3 : As migration increases price of diﬀerentiated goods falls. The welfare
of the domestic labour increases with migration.
.& Welfare of the Source Country
In this section we look at the beneﬁt of source country. In autarky, the countries cannot
trade with each other. But we assume that migrants can return with the goods after
purchasing them from the host country. The production and demand in the source
country is therefore obtained only in accordance to the labour force and wage rate
available in source country.
We assume that both host and source countries exhibit same types of taste, thus the
same Cobb-Douglas utility function is applicable. Similar to host, there are two sectors of
production in source, one is homogenous sector and the other one is diﬀerentiated sector.
The homogenous sector exhibits constant returns to scale which gives wage rate w. But
the demand of diﬀerentiated good is of CES love of variety form. The production in
diﬀerentiated sector is deﬁned by increasing returns to scale similar to host country.
Productivities of the ﬁrms are now obtained from the distribution Ga, as has been
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discussed in section 2.4.
We can carry out the whole calculation based on the above assumptions but it is not
essential as the results are similar to what we had in the case of host country. It is
however essential that we look at the price level to ﬁnd the eﬀect of migration on welfare
of those who is living behind. It is obtained as,
P=a

βL−M  


F

w

1−ρ

ρ
As the survival ceiling remains unchanged, the price level increases as the market size
falls. It is needless to say that the equilibrium number of ﬁrms is lower compared to no
migration case. As the price level increases the welfare of the people living behind
decreases. We can here relate our ﬁnding to the ʻbrain drainʼ literature by stating that
with migration of a fraction of population, the welfare of those who left behind decreases.
This result is diﬀerent from the inﬂuential paper of Grubel and Scott (1966) that based on
a perfectly competitive model stated that the welfare of those who stay in source country
remains unchanged.
We may want to see if the total welfare of the nationals of the source country increases
or decreases because of migration. By adding the utilities of the domestic labour and the
migrants we obtain,
U+U=β
1−β wL−M P
+β1−β w−sMP

=β1−β wLP
−wMP
+w−sMP

As wM<w−sM , if P is greater than or equal to P the welfare of the source
country is higher with migration. In order to have migration taking place we need that
the purchasing power of the wage received in host is higher than the purchasing power of
the wage receive in source. It implies that P is higher than P. Thus we can express the
results in proposition format,
Proposition 4 : The productivity threshold of the source country remains same but
price level increases as market size falls because of emigration. Without remittances
the welfare of people who left behind falls. If migrants return back with their income
the overall welfare of the nationals of source increases if the diﬀerentiated goods are
relatively cheaper in the host country.
!．Open Economy with Migration and Remittances
In the previous section we have described a special autarkic situation where the
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countries can send migrants and receive remittances in term of good but cannot trade
with each other. In this section we modify this assumption such that host and source
countries not only exchange migrants but also can trade with each other. In trade theory,
the transition from autarky to trade is done to show the changes in factor allocation,
production and the gain from trade. Our aim diﬀers from that as we look at the changes
in economy that migration brings. That is if migration takes place how it changes the
economy wide variables when the countries trade with each other. Here we only consider
the trade and migration between two countries. But with some manipulation the model
may be extended to include countries that only engage in intra-industry trade without any
migration.
. Basic Assumptions, Market Size and Equilibrium Wage Rate
As before we denote the source country using Tilda and the host country without Tilda.
We use subscript ʻTʼ to imply trade. For example, w denotes the wage rate of host
country and w denotes the wage rate of source country with trade.
We assume that both countries engage in trade of both goods. We assume standard
iceberg transport trade cost t>1 for diﬀerentiated sector implying, for example, to export
X amount of good, tX amount of goods must be shipped. On the other hand there is no
trade cost associated with homogenous good, which is a standard simplifying assumption. It
is also essential that both countries are large enough and the demand is such that they
both produce homogenous goods from which the wage rates of domestic workers can be
derived.
As there is no trade cost, price of homogenous good is same in both countries. As in the
case of autarky, the price of homogenous good is selected as numeraire. This gives the
wage rates w and w which are diﬀerent because of technological diﬀerences in homoge-
nous sector. For migration we require w>w. As before migrants receive lower wage
compared to the natives deﬁned as w−s. However as income of migrants is higher
compared to the source countryʼs wage rate, it must be followed by increased demand of
homogenous and diﬀerentiated goods. In the case of autarky it had initiated internal
migration of native labour force from heterogeneous to homogenous sector. It is may not
be the case in open economy. We assume that the sizes of the economies and the amount
of migration are such that the additional demand is entirely supported by production in
the migrantsʼ source country. Thus the numbers of native labour working in the homoge-
nous and diﬀerentiated sector of host country remain the same. Through these assump-
tions, it is possible for us to determine the average wage rate of diﬀerentiated goods sector
in a simpliﬁed manner without ﬁguring out the trade equilibrium between two countries.
Hence, the average wage of heterogeneous sector of host country is given by
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W=
wL+w−sM
L+M
=w−
sM
L+M
. L here is the number of native labour of host
country working in diﬀerentiated sector.
We consider one period of migration and assume that at the same period the migrants
return back to country after working and receiving wage. The wage received in host
country can be considered as a ʻtokenʼ that allows them to purchase goods from both
countries. The market size of the host is then given by,
H+PY=wL=Φ
Similarly the market size of source is given by,
H+PY=wL−M +w−sM=Φ
The above assumption regarding the market size is not completely at par with common
observation that migrants do spend some income in the host country. But it serves one
important purpose. Remittances without return migration should increase the per capita
welfare of the remaining migrants in the origin. The assumption of return migration with
complete repatriation of remittances allows us to isolate this eﬀect.
. Zero Cut Oﬀ Proﬁt Conditions
We now look at the zero cut oﬀ proﬁt conditions in source and host countries. It is
standard in the literature to assume that in order to operate in foreign country the ﬁrm
must bear a ﬁxed cost which is independent of export volume. Let us denote it as F in
units of labour. Melitz (2003) and Helpman et al. (2004) referred it as the cost incurred in
forming distribution and service networks in the foreign country. Similar costs in the home
country are included in F. The total ﬁxed cost for operating in the foreign market is
given as F times wage rate, hence we need to decide which wage rate is to be multiplied
to F. In the usual models the wage rate is assumed as 1 thus this matter has not
received attention. But in our model wage rate diﬀers. As distribution and forming
networks in the foreign market can use foreign labour force, the wage rate in production
and the wage rate in forming networks and distribution can diﬀer. For example in the
host country, the wage rate in production is W, but for distribution in the foreign market
it may only pay w. To simplify calculation we throughout assume same wage rates in
production and in foreign operations keeping in mind that they can diﬀer resulting in
substantial changes in calculations.
The zero cut oﬀ proﬁt condition of equation ⑽ can be redeﬁned for the host as,
a

 W
B=WF "
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For the home country the corresponding equation is,
a

 w
B=wF #
where B=A1−ρρ
, B=A1−ρρ
, A=βwLP
 and A=βΦP
. With
iceberg transport cost t>1 and a ﬁxed cost F in unit of labour for export we have,
πa=at 

W
B−FW
The equation implies that the ﬁrms of host country take the market size of the source
into consideration when exporting. Similarly for the export from the source to the host
country we get,
πa=at 
w
B−Fw
The above two equations generate export survival ceilings a and a where operating
proﬁts are zero. From them we get,
a
W
B=Ft
=a
w
B $
Utilising equations ", # and $ we get,
a
a
=ω

tf

=ω

ϕ=υ %
and,
a
a
=ω

tf

=ω

ϕ=υ &
where ω=
W
w
, f=
F
F
, ϕ=tf

 , υ=ω


ϕ υ=ω

ϕ
Thus ω stands for relative wage and f stands for the ratio of export cost to the
domestic operating cost. In the symmetric case where market size and wage rates are the
same, we get a=a

 and a=a. If ϕ>1 then in symmetric case it must be the case that
a

>a and a

>a implying the export requires higher threshold productivity level.
With asymmetry in market size and wage rates, comparison of the productivities of
domestic ﬁrms and exporters are not so straight forward. But we can compare productiv-
ity levels of domestic and foreign ﬁrms within an economy. As ω>1 and ϕ>1 we have
a>a and a

>a. That is ﬁrms exporting in an economy are more productive compared
to the domestic ﬁrms operating in that economy. Migration lowers the ratio ω which
changes the productivity gap between the foreign and domestic ﬁrms.
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. Equilibrium Productivity With Migration
Firms enter in domestic and foreign markets as long as the expected operating proﬁt of
the ﬁrms net entry cost is equal to zero. In the long run we have,
Eπ =


πadGa+


πadGa=FWQa

 +FWQa=wF
'
For the source country the equivalent equation is,
Eπ =


πadGa+


πadGa=FwQa+FwQa=wF
(
The ﬁrst terms of above two expressions are expected domestic proﬁt and the second
terms are expected export proﬁt. In the similar manner as in equations ⒄ to ⒆ and using
equations % and & we get,
W a


a 

+Wω

μΩ a


a
≃ 

=
wF
FK−1
)
where Ω=ϕf=tf

 . It can be shown that 0≤Ω≤1 as t≥1 and F>F. Similarly
by carrying out the calculation for the source country we obtain,
 a


a
≃ 

+ω

μΩ a


a 

=
F
FK−1
*
From equation ) and * the survival ceiling for domestic ﬁrms of the host is obtained
as,
 a


a 

=Λ
w
W
− Ww 



μΩ +
where Λ=
W
1−Ωw 
a
a 

. Here  a


a 

is the survival ceiling in case of autarky. As
Ω≤1, Λ is positive. The ﬁgure in the bracket must be positive to have positive survival
ceiling. When technological gap is nil that is μ= a
≃
a 

=1, the second part of the ﬁgure in
bracket is smaller than unity as W>w. So positive sign is automatically ensured. When
μ≥1 that is technological gap exists, we need the assumption that μ is not too large
relative to Ω and the wage ratio. Now we are interested to know how migration changes
the above survival ceiling. By diﬀerentiating equation + we get,
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da
dM
=aΛ


1
k
sL
L+M 
  wW −
W
w




μΩ



w
W
 −
kε
ε−1 w



W


 μΩ
The equation shows how migration alters the survival ceiling. The sign of the expression
depends on 
w
W
 −
kε
ε−1
w

W


 μΩ as other parts are positive by assumption.
Thus migration increases the survival ceiling of domestic ﬁrms if
w
W

>
kε
ε−1 
W
w




μΩ. The survival ceiling for the source country using equations )
and * is obtained as,
 a


a
≃ 

=Λ1− wW 
W
w



μΩ ,
where Λ=
1
1−Ω  a


a
≃ 

Again we assume that the term in bracket is positive to ensure positive survival ceiling.
In the numerator 0<μ≤1 and 0<Ω≤1, hence if wage ratios are low enough then term
in bracket is positive. By totally diﬀerentiating we get,
da
dM
=
1
k
a
≃
Λ


sL
L+M 
 (1−ww



W

 μΩ



1−ε+kε
ε−1
+ww

μΩW


By assumption (1−ww

W

 μΩ

 is positive. We have
1−ε+kε
ε−1
<0. Thus
as migration increases the survival ceiling of domestic ﬁrms of the source country falls.
Using equations & and , we get,
a=
a
v
=ω

ϕa
≃
Λ

(1−Γ)

 -
where, Γ=ww


W

 μΩ. By totally diﬀerentiating we get,
da
dM
=ϕa
≃
Λ

ω

(1−Γ)



1−ε+kε
ε−1
ww


W

 μΩ
+(1−Γ)


ε
ε−1
w

W


 
sL
(L+M )

The expression is long but as we can see easily the sign is positive implying that the
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survival ceiling of exporting ﬁrms of host increases because of migration. For the
exporting ﬁrms of source country we get,
a=ω

ϕaΛ

 wW −
W
w




μΩ


.
By diﬀerentiating we get,
da
dM
=ϕaΛ

Γω


1
k
Γ

w
W
 −
W
w




μΩ−
1
ε−1
W

w


 
sL
L+M 

where Γ= wW −
W
w




μΩ


. Thus if survival ceiling of domestic ﬁrms in host falls
the survival ceiling of exporting ﬁrms in host country also falls. Other wise survival ceiling
may increase. We can summarise the results in following proposition :
Proposition 5 : As migration increases the export survival ceiling of the host country
and domestic survival ceiling of the source country increase. The export survival
ceiling of the source falls if the domestic survival ceiling of the host falls.
The proposition summarises the results. But we need further discussion in this regard. A
well established result in the literature is that domestic survival ceiling of ﬁrms falls in
transition from autarky to open economy. An intuition of the situation of this paper can be
obtained if we compare equations ⒃ and '. In both cases the ﬁrms enter until the
expected proﬁt is equal to the entry cost. In autarky the ﬁrms operate only in domestic
market while in open economy the ﬁrms operate both in domestic and export market.
Because of the division of expected proﬁt between exporter and non-exporters, the non-
exporters, that is, domestic ﬁrms now survive if marginal cost is low. Similar thing
happens with migration. Migration increases the export survival ceiling of host ﬁrms.
Without migration the survival ceiling of the domestic ﬁrms falls. But as migration lowers
the operating cost it is also possible for domestic ﬁrms to enjoy higher survival ceiling due
to migration.
With migration the survival ceiling of domestic ﬁrms of the source country falls. Firms
in an open economy exports and operate in domestic market in a way that expected proﬁt
is zero. Therefore the fall in survival ceiling of domestic ﬁrms implies that domestic ﬁrms
are more productive. Survival ceiling of exporters of the source country should increase
implying that less productive ﬁrms of the source survive in export market. However this
relationship is not clearly observed with migration. With migration survival ceiling may
also fall implying that only more productive ﬁrms can survive with migration.
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. Number Active Firms
Let us assume that the mass of entrants in host and source is given by N and N

 .
The aggregate price in term of number entrants can be written as,
P
= 

pidi=


N 
Wa
ρ 

dGa +


N  
wat
ρ 

dGa 
=NW
va ρ
+N w
vaρ
t
where va =


adGa  and va=


adGa . As a

 W
B=F, by
substitution and after necessary calculation we obtain,
 a


a 

=
βwL1−ρ
FK[N

W+N

wμ
ω

Ω]
and,
 a


a
≃ 

=
βΦ1−ρ
FK[N

Wμ
ω

Ω+N w]
By carrying out the calculation further we get following two equations,
NW+
w
W
δN wμ
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FK
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W
w
NWμω

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FK
where N= a


a 

N  , N
= a


a
≃ 

N  and δ=
1−
w
W
ω

μΩ

w
W
−ω

μΩ
W
w
. Thus N and N 
are number of surviving ﬁrms in host and home countries. By solving we obtain,
N
=
1
W1−Ω

βwL1−ρ
FK 1−
Φ
wL 
w
W
δμ Ww 

  /
and
N =
1
w1−Ω

βΦ1−ρ
FK 1−
wL
Φ
δ Ww μ
W
w




Ω 0
Equations / and 0 can be diﬀerentiated to analyse the eﬀects of migration. But the
calculation is very cumbersome to present and simple visual inspection reveals some
important information. The sign of the both expressions must be positive to have positive
number of ﬁrms. In equation / the market size of source has negative eﬀect on the
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number of ﬁrms in host. On the other hand if average wage in the host falls, then number
of ﬁrms in the host increases. In equation 0 the opposite happens as market size of the
source has positive eﬀect and wage ratio has negative eﬀect on ﬁrmʼs number. The overall
change also depends on δ. Diﬀerentiation reveals (not shown) that δ falls with migration.
Thereby overall number of surviving ﬁrms depends together on Φ, ω and δ.
.$ The Price Level and Welfare of the Host Country
The expression for price level is similar to the expression we obtained in the autarky
that is,
P=a

βwL 


F

W

1−ρ

ρ
 1
Using equation + we obtain,
P=aΛ

 wW −
W
w



μΩ


(βwL )


F

W

(1−ρ)

ρ 2
In order to evaluate the eﬀect of migration we may totally diﬀerentiate equation 2 and
evaluate the total change in price level given the total change in migration. The expression
is again long but simple inspection of equations 1 and 2 can give us indication about the
possible eﬀect of migration. We already know that wage rate falls with migration. Hence it
should eﬀect price level negatively. However a may increase or decrease with migration.
If a falls then price level deﬁnitely falls. The intuition behind the proposition is simple. If
survival ceiling falls, only the more productive ﬁrms can operate in market. Thereby price
level falls. In addition decreasing wage rate inﬂuences price level negatively. But if survival
ceiling increases less productive ﬁrms manage to stay in the market. So price level may
increase if the eﬀect of increase in survival ceiling completely counteracts the eﬀect of the
fall of wage rate. It follows therefore if price level falls, the welfare of the host increases
and vice versa.
.& Welfare of the Source Country
The price level of the source country is given by,
P=a

w

βΦ 


1−ρ

ρF

 3
Again by inspection we can see how migration aﬀects the price level. In one hand
migration increases the survival productivity implying increase in the price level. However
migration implies lower price level via the increased market size. Thus overall eﬀect of
migration on price level is ambiguous. The utility of source is given as,
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U=β
1−β wL−M +w−sM P

Thus utility is higher if price is lower and migration is higher. But we can not
unambiguously determine the changes in welfare. In proposition,
Proposition 6 : Emigration increases the survival ceiling of domestic ﬁrms of the
source country which raises the price level. Increase in migration on the other hand
decreases price level via increased market size. Thu soverall eﬀect of migration on
price level and welfare of source country is ambiguous.
4．Conclusion
The paper analysed the eﬀect of migration between two countries within the framework
of a monopolistic competition model with heterogeneity of productivity across countries and
ﬁrms. The paper provided us with a method of analysing the economic beneﬁt of
movement of people from one country to another country which is feasible within the
framework of bilateral or multilateral migration agreements.
International migration is a highly contentious issue and agreements usually are lacking.
A few studies have, using simulation, tried to evaluate the economic beneﬁt of international
migration on global and regional scales. But there is a shortage of works that can provide
guidelines to individual countries. Our study aims towards that gap.
Our analysis showed that in autarky that is when the countries do not trade with each
other then migration from low wage source (technologically backward) to high wage host
(technologically advanced) country increases the welfare of the host country. Migration
also allows the relatively ineﬃcient ﬁrms to survive by lowering the threshold productivity
level. On the other hand the productivity threshold remains the same in the source
country and the people living behind experiences a reduction of welfare as price level
increases due to the fall or market size. However when the migrants return back to
source with remittances, the total welfare that is the sum of welfare of migrants and non-
migrants of source may go up. This result is opposite of what obtained in the inﬂuential
paper of Grubel and Scott (1966) that argued that the welfare of the people staying
behind remain unchanged. In open economy that is when the countries trade with each
other the result is not so straight forward. We obtained that migration lowers the
productivity threshold of exporter of the host. However migration may or may not lower
the productivity threshold of the domestic ﬁrms of the host. On the other hand migration
lowers the productivity threshold of the domestic ﬁrms of source but may or may not
decrease the same for the exporters of source country. The eﬀects of migration on the
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welfare and price levels of the source and host were ambiguous.
The study has therefore provided us with some understanding of how migration may
aﬀect the economies of sending and receiving countries. It is hence adding up to the on-
going debate on the issue surrounding international migration. The study is however
looking at eﬀects of international migration between two nations. But in reality migration
can also take place between the countries that do not trade much with each other.
Migration of labour to a country may also aﬀect the international trade of countries where
migration do not take place. In this sense the study is a bit limited as it is incapable of
capturing these scenarios. To obtain a stronger grasp of the eﬀect of international
migration, models needs to be developed that will enable analysis in a multi-country
setting. An extension of the model in that direction will be highly useful in migration
related dialogues.
Note
1） Readers may look at WTO website http://www.wto.org/ and ʻHandbook of Trade in Servicesʼ
edited by Matto et al. (2008). Bossche (2008) gives a detailed discussion of WTO rules and
comparison between agreements.
2） For guidance on calculation and interpretation see Brakman and Heijdra (2004).
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